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Introduction
Background and objectives
The European Union (EU) is an important
export market for countries with high levels
of illegality and poor governance in the fo-
rest  sector.  Consequently,  the  EU initiated
the EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance
and Trade (FLEGT) action plan (EC 2003).
In  March  2013,  an  additional  step  was
taken with  Regulation  no.  995/2010 of the
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,
commonly known as the EU Timber Regula-
tion (EUTR -  EC 2013a). This new regula-
tion raises important questions for the future
of both  the European  and the international
timber trade. The EUTR was welcomed by
many as a long awaited effort to curb illegal
logging.  However,  particularly in  the  early
stages of its implementation,  the regulation
could cause ambiguity in  international  tim-
ber markets, when the effects and/or the re-
quirements  are  not  fully  understood  or
known by agents and stakeholders (Giurca et
al.  2013).  These  issues  are  likely  to  arise
when  each  Member  State  (MS)  transposes
the new regulation  into its own policy fra-
mework.
An effort has been made to disseminate in-
formation  and adapt  viable  risk assessment
and risk mitigation procedures through ade-
quate Due Diligence Systems (DDSs) by Eu-
ropean companies, industry federations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and MS
(EFI  2011).  Following  consultations  with
stakeholders  and  experts,  the  EC  has  ac-
knowledged  that  certain  aspects  of  the
EUTR and its  non-legislative  aspects  need
clarification,  hence producing guidance do-
cuments and supporting various information
campaigns  (EC  2013a,  2013b).  There  are
still  some  concerns  among  operators  and
traders regarding uncertainty and risk aver-
sion (FLAN 2013).
As the EUTR was only recently introduced,
assessments of the effects on timber markets
of this regulation are very scarce, especially
as the full  impact of EUTR will  be visible
only once all national legal frameworks are
implemented (FLAN 2013). Papers assessing
agents’  and  stakeholders’  interpretations  of
the new regulation are also scant. However,
how the EUTR is understood and regarded
by different  stakeholders  will  clearly be of
paramount  importance  for  the  implementa-
tion of the regulation.
Since we are dealing with a new regulation,
it  is  likely that  different  actors  involved  in
the international timber-trade (hence, direct-
ly affected by the EUTR) have not had time
to fully grasp the potential impact of EUTR.
The new regulation has, however, generated
a  lot  of  discussions  in  the  media  and  the
opinion  of some stakeholders  is  already in
the public eye. There is, however, currently a
high  degree  of  ambiguity  around  the  new
regulation  in  this  early stage  of  its  imple-
mentation (Giurca et  al.  2013).  In  order  to
further the understanding of how the EUTR
is perceived  by different  stakeholders,  opi-
nion  statements  have  been  collected  and
summarized. These were identified in diffe-
rent publications found online after running
an  extensive  desk-based  search.  We  use
frames in  order  to  simplify certain features
and relations of a complex issue, such as the
EUTR, and translate them into more relevant
terms (Schön & Rein  1994,  Lidskog et  al.
2013).  This  paper  analyses  how  different
stakeholders perceive, or frame, the regula-
tory objectives of the EUTR, on which as-
pects  of the regulation  they focus,  and  the
perceived  problems and  resulting  conflicts.
The focus is on perceived risks, benefits and
uncertainty.  This study is not exhaustive in
regard to perceptions of the EUTR, but ra-
ther aims to provide some contrasting exam-
ples of stakeholder perceptions,  and to dis-
cuss their implications.
Policy context
The  FLEGT  Action  plan  introduces  two
policy  instruments:  the  Voluntary  Partner-
ship  Agreements  (VPAs)  and  the  EUTR.
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The EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) is the most recent effort by the European
Union (EU) to curb imports of illegally sourced timber. The regulation raises
important questions concerning the international timber trade. In order to suc-
cessfully implement this regulation it is of paramount importance to classify
the actors concerned, and examine how they regard it. The current study col-
lects and summarizes opinion statements of stakeholders as found in different
online publications. Though the problem of illegal logging and its associated
trade is acknowledged by all parties, there are concerns as to whether the
EUTR is the proper instrument to address this issue. Whilst some stakeholders
see the EUTR as advantageous for their businesses, others see it as an impedi-
ment. Law enforcement, lack of guidance, and bureaucracy were other issues
raised. The trade-off between effective legislation and ease of trade was also
highlighted.  Transparent and consistent application of the EUTR,  with clear
guidelines for exerting due diligence, should diminish the degree of possible
unwanted side-effects such as trade diversion and substitution of temperate
timber for tropical timber.
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Both instruments address the problem of il-
legal  logging,  the  first  aimed  at  producing
countries whereas the latter at EU importers.
VPAs and EUTR are meant to reinforce each
other (Fig. 1).
Under the EUTR, European operators (the
main  focus  of  the  legislation)  are  held  ac-
countable  for  the  products  that  they  bring
into  the  EU.  Operators  are  encouraged  to
produce  adequate  documentation  as  proof
for legally sourced timber (Cashore & Stone
2012). Each MS is responsible for determi-
ning how to  control  the legality of  its  im-
ports,  and how sanctions are applied if ne-
cessary (EFI 2013).
EUTR  covers  a  broad  range  of  timber
products  (including  solid  wood  products,
flooring, plywood, pulp and paper) and sets
out  three main requirements  for EU opera-
tors.  (i)  Prohibition - this  prohibits  placing
illegally harvested timber or timber products
on the EU market. (ii) DDSs - which sets the
following  requirements:  provide  access  to
information on imported timber (country of
harvest,  concession,  species,  sizes,  quanti-
ties), implement a risk assessment procedure
(evaluate the risk of occurrence of illegally
harvested  products)  and  apply  risk  mitiga-
tion  measures  and  procedures.  (iii)  Trace-
ability obligation - operators must keep de-
tailed records with information on their sup-
pliers (Carden et al. 2012, EC 2013a).
Under the EUTR regulation, “illegally har-
vested” means harvested in contravention of
the  applicable  legislation  in  the country of
harvest  (EC  2013a).  Hence,  the  basis  for
defining illegal logging is the legislation of
the producing country, considering that there
is no international agreement on how to de-
fine legally harvested  timber.  EUTR expli-
citly states that  timber and timber products
covered by FLEGT licenses or  Convention
on International  Trade in  Endangered  Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) per-
mits meet its requirements. It could be said
that  the EUTR creates a strong market ad-
vantage  for  such  products.  Furthermore,
though  certified  products  provide  evidence
of legally sourced timber, certification alone
does  not  automatically ensure  legality,  un-
like FLEGT or CITES licenses (Cashore &
Stone 2012). Certified products may be con-
sidered as low-risk within the DDSs of com-
panies, but it has not been determined if this
approach  will  be  accepted  by law enforce-
ment  bodies  (TFT  2013).  Therefore,  the
exact role of certification under the EUTR is
yet to be determined.
Theoretical setting
Requirements imposed by a new regulation
can be perceived as complex, ambiguous or
indeterminate (Lidskog et al. 2013). Conse-
quently,  actors may associate complex phe-
nomena,  such  as  the  EUTR,  with  certain
characteristics such as safe or risky; predic-
table  or  indeterminate;  important  or  unim-
portant. It is therefore essential, when assess-
ing how a regulation  may be perceived,  to
consider reducing its complexity and to ma-
nage uncertainty (Lidskog et al. 2011).
Through frames, certain features and rela-
tions of a complex issue (such as the EUTR)
can be selected and translated into simpler,
more  relevant  terms  (Schön  & Rein  1994,
Lidskog et  al.  2013).  This  aims to  make a
problematic  situation  more  intelligible.  A
widely accepted  definition  of frames is  of-
fered by Entman (1993): “To frame is to se-
lect some aspects of a perceived reality and
make them more salient in a communicating
context, in such a way as to promote a par-
ticular problem definition, causal interpreta-
tion, moral evaluation, and/or treatment rec-
ommendation for the item described”.
Schön  & Rein  (1994) describe  frames as
being  created  to  represent  beliefs,  values,
and  perspectives  held by particular  interest
groups. Likewise, frames have normative im-
plications meaning that they can be used to
mobilize  opinions  and  call  for  solutions  in
the  implementation  process  (Entman 1993,
Schön & Rein 1994, Lidskog et al. 2013).
Materials and methods
Literature search
All materials for the content analysis were
collected through an extensive internet desk-
based search conducted during the same pe-
riod  as  the  search  for  scientific  papers.
Google  (http://www.google.se)  and  Google
Scholar (http://www.scholar.google.se) were
the main tools used for accessing free-online
publications. The most commonly used Goo-
gle  search-terms  comprised:  “EUTR”,  “EU
Timber  Regulation”,  “FLEGT VPA”,  “Im-
plementation  EUTR”,  “Impacts  EUTR”,
“Stakeholders  and  EUTR”,  “Actors  and
EUTR”, “Risks EUTR”, “Perception EUTR”
and “Understanding EUTR”. This search re-
sulted in a considerable number of govern-
ment,  media,  trade-federation  and  NGO
webpages,  news,  reports  and  studies.  The
relevant  search  results  were  considered  in
their entirety and admissible links on these
pages were followed as well. The final sam-
ple for the analysis comprised 15 materials
relevant  for  content  analysis,  listed  in  Ap-
pendix 1.
Content analysis
Using qualitative  content  analysis,  the  15
secondary sources were scanned for opinion
statements  to  identify actors’  overall  views
on the EUTR. According to Bryman (2008),
content analysis is an approach for analyzing
documents and texts, quantifying content in
terms of predetermined categories systemati-
cally  and  replicable.  The  present  content
analysis  merges a  deductive  approach  (fra-
mes are theoretically derived from the litera-
ture  and  then  coded  in  a  standard  content
analysis) with a hermeneutic approach (fra-
mes are identified by providing an interpre-
tative  account  of  media  texts  linking  up
frames with broader cultural elements - Mat-
thes & Kohring 2008).
Two units of analysis were used: the entire
document and the relevant statements quoted
in  the document.  Each  document  was read
through in its entirety and formal categories
were identified including: author (e.g., pub-
lishing  organization);  date  (whether  publi-
shed before or after EUTR was introduced);
and style of the material (blog, newsfeed, ar-
ticle or report). This also allowed the identi-
fication and classification of the main actors
in the analysis. “Actor” is defined here as a
person or group that has a vested interest in
the  EUTR.  The  opinion  statements  of  the
different actors comprise the second unit of
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Fig. 1 - The FLEGT Action Plan and its two instruments and main features.
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analysis.  “Statement”  is  defined  as  “all
claims  made  as  either  direct  or  indirect
quotes in one article made by one person or
entity”  (Kleinschmit  &  Sjöstedt  2014).
Hence, the number of statements is the same
as the number of speakers but different from
the  number  of  documents,  as  some  docu-
ments might contain multiple actors with dif-
fering opinions.
Each of the opinion statements were read
and categorized  based  on  the general  mes-
sage  advocated:  whether  they  are  “favora-
ble”, “ambivalent” or “unfavorable” towards
the EUTR. “Favorable” is defined here as an
actor’s  commendatory,  generally  positive
and/ or encouraging disposition towards the
regulation.  Actors  categorized  under  “am-
bivalent”  gave  a  generally  equivocal  mes-
sage that expresses both pros and cons, im-
partial  and/or  simply  indefinable  stand-
points.  Under  “unfavorable”  we  list  actors
who  displayed  a  general  adversity,  skepti-
cism and/or criticism towards the regulation.
In line with the frame definition by Entman
(1993) outlined above, frame elements - ea-
sily  and  unambiguously  detectable  in  the
content analysis - were identified. Finally, an
assessment  was  made  as  to  how the  state-
ments were weighted and to what extent the
arguments included a discussion of risk and
uncertainty concerning the consequences.
Results
Classifying the actors and their roles 
within the EUTR
The EUTR creates a new framework within
which various actors involved in the timber
trade can interact. The regulation incorpora-
tes the roles of existing actors with new ac-
tors  who  are  responsible  for  new  tasks
(ClientEarth 2011). For the purpose of this
analysis,  it  is  important  to  categorize these
actors, to classify their roles and responsibi-
lities, and to understand how they interact.
Officially,  the  EUTR  operates  with  refe-
rence to six main actors (ClientEarth 2011,
Carden et al. 2012):
• the European Commission (EC): responsi-
ble for the effective implementation of the
regulation;
• Member states (MS): each responsible for
the  implementation  of  the  regulation
through national competent authorities;
• Operators: the primary placers of timber or
timber products on the European market;
• Traders: actors who receive timber or tim-
ber products from operators  and trade on
the European market;
• Monitoring Organizations (MOs): assisting
operators with adequate DDSs.
The EC assigns different MOs who in turn
provide  services  to  operators  by  assisting
with  DDSs.  Competent  authorities,  desig-
nated  by each  MS,  are  responsible  for  the
verification  of  the  functionality  of  MOs.
Hence,  although the EC can offer or  with-
draw recognition to MOs, there is no inves-
tigative authority and is therefore relying on
the  evaluation  of  competent  authorities
(ClientEarth  2011).  MOs  offer  services  to
operators and past or ongoing relationships
between the two parties are therefore to be
considered  in  the  implementation  (Client-
Earth 2011).
This study categorized the EC and MS as
“political actors”. Both operators and traders
are also referred to as “businesses” through-
out  the paper. In  addition,  MOs as well  as
“trade-related  organizations”  including  tim-
ber trade federations (TTFs) and other simi-
lar  organizations  (profit  and/or  non-profit)
are placed in the same category, under “tra-
de-related organizations”.  The rationale  be-
ing that,  although different,  such  organiza-
tions assist and/or support businesses in the
interpretation  and  implementation  of  the
EUTR.
The EUTR is  under  scrutiny from public
opinion and media as well as from different
environmental  and  research  organizations
(WWF 2009). Various NGOs play an impor-
tant role in influencing both the formulation
and implementation of the EUTR; i.e., 58 in-
ternational NGOs have called on the EC to
adopt a regulation against illegal timber im-
ports,  but  have  subsequently  criticized  the
regulation’s  implementation  and  effective-
ness  (Global  Witness  2013,  Van  Oijen  &
Monsembula  2013).  Universities  and  re-
search  organizations,  referred  to  as  “re-
search” throughout the paper, are also con-
sidered important and influential actors that
scrutinize various aspects of the regulation.
Actors’ disposition towards the EUTR
The opinion statements were analyzed and
categorized  according  to  actors’  “general
disposition” towards the EUTR. Statements
from various actors are categorized in  Tab.
1. The numbers in parenthesis represent the
reference to the source of each opinion state-
ment (numbers 1 to 15) listed in Appendix 1.
Not surprisingly, the results indicate a con-
siderable  heterogeneity  amongst  actors’
standpoints. Given the fairly recent introduc-
tion of the regulation,  most actors are cau-
tious  in  expressing  definitive  standpoints.
Political actors such as the EC - which advo-
cate good forest governance, sustainable fo-
rest management, and the necessity to com-
bat illegal logging - appear to  be the main
supporters of the regulation (Appendix 1:1).
There are diverging opinions amongst busi-
ness  representatives.  Unfavorable  stand-
points  were  found  typically  to  come  from
companies which have faced public scrutiny
and that have been accused of engaging in
unlawful  practices  (Global  Witness  2013,
FLAN 2013). Business representatives gene-
rally  criticized  the  uncertainty  around  the
regulation indicating “the lack of operational
guidance and a functional oversight mecha-
nism”  (Appendix  1:2).  Others  expressed
concerns  that  the  focus  is  mostly on  legal
compliance, rather than on both legality and
sustainability (Appendix 1:3).
Favorable  standpoints  were  clearly  de-
tectable in statements from North American
trade-related  organizations:  “…one  of  the
world’s  largest  hardwood  exporting  indus-
tries […] has a considerable stake in eradi-
cating illegal wood from trade […] and has
also  been  closely involved  with,  and  fully
supports, the efforts by the European Union
to enforce the EU Timber Regulation from 3
March 2013” (Appendix 1:4).  Other  repre-
sentatives  state  that  the  EUTR  “could  be
very  beneficial  for  Canadian  producers  of
wood and products made of woods that are
harvested  in  Canada,  given  the  country’s
negligible  risk  status”  (Appendix  1:3).  Al-
though  there  were  a  vast  number  of  state-
ments from other trade-related organizations,
few expressed a clear standpoint. However,
these opinion statements generally suggest a
need for improved guidance and clarification
as  there  is  “still  widespread  confusion”
around some details of the EUTR (Appendix
1:5 and 1:6).
Some governance experts inferred that the
EUTR “is likely to violate at least one sub-
stantive  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)
provision” because it  “…makes the marke-
ting of illegally logged timber a criminal of-
fence and therefore creates a “de facto” re-
striction  on  the  importation  of  timber…”
(Appendix  1:7).  Some  WTO members  ex-
pressed  concerns  regarding  the  regulation,
representatives  for  Canada  noted  that
EUTR’s  “…traceability  requirements  could
provide  an unfair  competitive  advantage to
manufacturers of forest  products  in  the EU
compared to their international competitors”
(Appendix  1:7).  Indonesian  representatives
also expressed concerns related  to  EUTR’s
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Tab. 1 - Actors and categorized opinion statements. Numbers in parenthesis represent the
reference to the source of each opinion statement (numbers 1 to 15) listed in Appendix 1.
Actors Favorable Ambivalent Unfavorable
Political actors (1:1) - -
Businesses - - (1:2); (1:3)
Trade-related organizations (1:3);(1:4) (1:5);(1:6) (1:7)
NGOs - - (1:8);(1:9);(1:10);(1:11)
Media - - (1:12);(1:13);(1:14)
Research - - (1:15)
Giurca A & Jonsson R - iForest 8: 681-686 
DDS requirements (Appendix 1:7).
The view of NGOs towards  the EUTR is
varied  and  interesting.  International  NGOs
have long urged governments to adopt a tim-
ber trade legislation and many NGOs had de-
clared their support for the EU FLEGT Ac-
tion and EUTR (Jakarta Globe 2013). How-
ever,  since  the  introduction  of  the  EUTR,
some NGOs have criticized the Regulation’s
weak law enforcement, implementation, and
effectiveness (Appendix 1:8; 1:9; 1:10). This
has  led  to  calls  for  governments  to  take
prompt  and  punitive  actions  against  opera-
tors who have been found to be breaking the
law: “if any governments in  the EU turn a
blind  eye  to  illegal  imports,  the  forest  de-
struction in areas including the Congo Basin
will  continue  to  be  driven  by  our  use  of
wood and associated products” (Appendix 1:
11). Consequently, NGOs are concerned that
weak penalties will lead to ineffective regu-
lation.
The media has a particularly important role
in  providing the  general  public  with  infor-
mation that may be otherwise difficult to ob-
tain  (Kleinschmit  &  Sjöstedt  2014).  Like-
wise, the media can serve as an indicator for
public opinion concerning political decision
makers  (Kleinschmit  & Krott  2008,  Klein-
schmit & Sjöstedt 2014). The media also has
a more insidious influence on society, influ-
encing and sometimes distorting public opi-
nion on certain issues (Kleinschmit & Sjöst-
edt 2014). Hence, discerning the exact stand
points expressed in digital mass media (web-
sites, newsletters, and blogs) is difficult,  as
different media organizations may report  in
unbiased ways, others may be less objective
and represent vested interests. Media orien-
ted specifically at the trade sector displayed
some  criticism  towards  the  regulation,  re-
garding its impacts on trade: “the significant
extra cost and complications caused by the
legislation  have exacerbated  the continuing
commercial  decline  of  imports”  (Appendix
1: 12). Stark criticism and/or general adver-
sity  were  advocated  by  some  information
platforms,  arguing  that  “it  is  clear  that  the
burdensome  EUTR and  FLEGT VPAs  are
not  only failing timber  consumers in  deve-
loped nations […] but also failing to curb il-
legal  logging  itself…”  (Appendix  1:13,  1:
14).
Research  on  any  related  topic  regarding
EUTR is generally scarce, and research orga-
nizations  have  been  somewhat  reserved  in
expressing standpoints on the EUTR. Some
researchers from international  organizations
have  expressed  criticism  regarding  the
EUTR, in particular in regards to the impact
on small scale-logging in developing coun-
tries: “…we saw this as a welcome develop-
ment, but very quickly, began to realize that
there could be another side to the story […]
loggers now have to bear the costs of gene-
rating new forest management plans, verify-
ing timber and issuance of a legality license
that  meets the requirements  of the EU and
US…” (Appendix 1:15).
Frame analysis
Analyzing  actors’  general  views  towards
the  regulation  helps  outline  the  general
frames for discussion. The problem of illegal
logging  and  its  associated  trade  act  as  a
“master frame”, or a principle  to which all
other standpoints relate (Eder 1996, Lidskog
et  al.  2011).  Furthermore,  the  ecological,
economic  and  social  risks  it  poses  are  ac-
knowledged  by  all  actors  irrespective  of
whether  they  are  favorable,  ambivalent  or
unfavorable  towards  the  EUTR.  However,
actors  conceptualize  the  EUTR differently.
Those  favoring  the  EUTR  advocate  the
“competitive advantage” for legal exporters,
while actors that are unfavorable towards the
regulation  define  problems  such  as:  “com-
petitive  disadvantage”,  “law  enforcement”,
“guidance” and “bureaucracy”. These frames
are  elaborated  below and later  summarized
in Tab. 2.
• “Competitive  advantage”-  those  favoring
the EUTR, wish to see a competitive ele-
ment  to  legal  exports.  Exporters  from
countries where illegal logging is a minor
risk  see  the  regulation  as  beneficial  for
their  businesses.  Hence,  representatives
from North American and European trade-
related organizations and businesses are in
favor of the EUTR. The regulation is seen
as reinvigorating a legitimate forest indus-
try which has been undermined by illegally
sourced timber on the international market.
• The antithesis of the above frame is “com-
petitive  disadvantage”.  Timber-exporting
countries  from  both  the  Northern  and
Southern hemisphere have expressed con-
cern  regarding  potential  trade-restrictive
effects  of  the  legislation  and  the  (unfair)
competitive  advantage  for  EU  countries.
However,  exporters  from the  (perceived)
more risky sources in the Global South are
seen to be potentially even more disadvan-
taged by the regulation.
• “Law enforcement”- some actors criticized
the (weak) enforcement of the regulation.
This has been debated by political  actors
prior to the introduction of the EUTR and,
as  previously  mentioned,  recently by va-
rious international NGOs. Other concerns
raised by actors  are:  the interpretation  of
legality (which differs among traders), and
inconsistent (weak) penalty systems which
differ between MS.
• “Guidance”- the general consensus among
business  representatives  and  trade-related
organizations is the perceived lack of oper-
ational  guidance  for  EUTR.  The  regula-
tion’s requirements are ambiguous in prac-
tice.  Among affected  stakeholders  confu-
sion  and  misinterpretation  of  EUTR  re-
quirements seems to persist, at least of this
early stage of the regulation’s implementa-
tion.  Some businesses in Europe have al-
ready been found to contravene EUTR re-
quirements.
• “Bureaucracy”-  another  defined  problem
among stakeholders was the administrative
burden  and  associated  additional  costs
linked with EUTR compliance. The regula-
tion’s due diligence requirements for Euro-
pean  operators  (access  to  information  on
imported timber, risk assessment procedu-
res,  risk  mitigation  measures  and  proce-
dures)  and  traceability  obligations  imply
extra workload introducing accurate docu-
mentation  that  is created in  a transparent
and unambiguous  manner.  These require-
ments  are  not  only  tedious  but  they  are
also costly. Generating new forest manage-
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Tab. 2 - Identified frames, the actors that promote them, and representative quotes (from Appendix 1).
Frame Actor(s) Opinion statement example Source(Appendix 1)
Competitive 
advantage





“ …could provide an unfair competitive advantage to manufacturers of 




NGOs Media “…if any governments in the EU turn a blind eye to illegal imports, the    
forest destruction […] will continue”
(1:11)
Guidance Businesses Trade-related 
organizations
“…lack of operational guidance and a functional oversight mechanism …” (1:2)
Bureaucracy Businesses Trade-related 
organizations Media
“…significant extra cost and complications caused by the legislation” (1:12)
Stakeholders’ opinions on the EU timber regulation 
ment plans in order to comply with the le-
gal standards of the EUTR, and achieving
certification,  also implies  additional  costs
for loggers in developing countries.
Discussion
All of the actors considered in the analysis
recognized  and  acknowledged  the  problem
of illegal logging, the risks it poses, and the
urgent need to combat it. However, concerns
as to whether the EUTR is the best method
to combat illegal logging and its associated
trade is at the core of the debate, resulting in
conflicting frames among actors. In general,
timber-exporting  countries  have  expressed
their concerns in terms of the potential trade-
restrictive  effects  of  legislation  (Geraets  &
Natens 2013).
While some actors see the EUTR as benefi-
cial for their businesses, others fear the regu-
lation could be disadvantageous. The EUTR
creates  a  strong  market  advantage  for  pro-
ducts coming from low-risk countries; gene-
rally those in  the northern  hemisphere.  On
the  other  hand  exporters  from developing,
high-risk countries feel disadvantaged by the
regulation  as  it  creates  administrative  hur-
dles and extra costs associated with compli-
ance.  In  fact,  bureaucracy-related  concerns
are expressed by actors from both importing
and exporting countries.
It  is  notable  that  some  perceived  short-
comings are  at  least  theoretically addressa-
ble,  i.e., they could be solved if dealt with,
including enforcement and guidance issues.
EUTR’s penalty system has also been criti-
cized  since  each  member  state  decides  the
level of fines to be applied and there is no
consensus  on  the  compatibility  of  fines
within  the  EU.  Creating  effective  penalty
systems  at  a  national  level  is  critical  to
strengthen  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the
EUTR, as pointed out by Levashova (2011).
Bureaucracy is a structural, or unavoidable,
problem as any legislation which attempts to
curb the illegal timber trade will, in all likeli-
hood,  incur  some  degree  of  bureaucracy,
costs, and restrict free trade (Geraets & Na-
tens 2013). Indeed, stricter law enforcement
would  be  likely  to  increase  this  “shortco-
ming”, as the possibility to circumvent regu-
lation  would  diminish.  Thus,  in  this  sense
there is a trade-off between effective legisla-
tion  and  the  ease  of  trade.  Increased  gui-
dance  (by  the  EC,  MS  governments,  and
MOs) should  at  least  alleviate this  bureau-
cratic burden.
Steps to address the lack of guidance have,
in fact, been taken. Thus, following consul-
tations with stakeholders, experts from MS,
members of the FLEGT facility and the EC
acknowledged  that  certain  aspects  of  the
EUTR needed clarification. Hence, guidance
and  clarification  for  definitions  such  as:
“placing  on  the  market”,  “negligible  risk”,
and “complexity of the supply chain” were
produced. Further, details were given on the
“requirement for documents indicating com-
pliance  of  timber  with  applicable  legisla-
tion”, “the product scope”, “the role of third
parties’  verified  schemes  in  the  process  of
risk assessment and risk mitigation”, “regu-
lar  evaluation  of  a  due  diligence  system”,
“composite  products”,  "forest  sector",  and
“treatment  of  CITES  and  FLEGT-licensed
timber” (EC 2013b). Apparently,  additional
measures to increase transparency and clarity
have been called for.
There are frames that are, at least in a se-
mantic sense, irreconcilable: competitive ad-
vantage  and  disadvantage  respectively.  Of
course  the  purpose  of  the  legislation  is  to
disadvantage illegal exporters to the benefit
of legal trade. However, the legislation does
not intend to provide competitive advantages
based on the geographical location of timber
sources.  To  some  extent  at  least,  well
thought  through  routines  for  exerting  due
diligence should decrease the risk of this un-
wanted effect of the legislation. Again, MOs
play a key role here.
Understanding  how stakeholders  interpret
and  evaluate  the  EUTR should  help  avoid
unwanted detrimental side-effects of the re-
gulation  on  the international  market.  If  the
requirements of the EUTR are not fully un-
derstood, however, European importers may
assess the risks associated with the value of
the wood they want to purchase and opt for
more reliable timber sources within Europe
and North America. Hence, the general un-
certainty  around  EUTR  interpretation  may
become detrimental  for  tropical  timber  ex-
ports (Giurca et al. 2013).
In  addition,  any ambiguity related  to  the
EUTR, along with associated costs for com-
pliance, could encourage producers in deve-
loping  countries  to  export  timber  to  other,
more weakly regulated markets (Giurca et al.
2013). This trade diversion could be reduced
by a  transparent  and  consistent  application
of the EUTR, again with clear guidelines for
exerting due diligence,  and by encouraging
legal  exports  from  developing  countries
through, for example, price premiums and/or
long-term contracts. These two mechanisms
are largely in the hands of market forces.
Conclusion
This research has provided a valuable first
step  in  understanding  stakeholder  percep-
tions on the likely impact of the EUTR. As
stakeholders seem to have reached consensus
on the problem of illegal logging and its as-
sociated trade, there are still concerns as to
whether the EUTR is the proper instrument
to address this issue. Some stakeholders see
the  EUTR as  advantageous  for  their  busi-
nesses,  others see it  as an impediment  and
raise issues such as: law enforcement, lack of
guidance  and  bureaucracy.  This  analysis
highlighted  the  trade-off  between  effective
legislation and ease of trade. In order to di-
minish the degree of possible unwanted side-
effects (such as trade diversion and substitu-
tion of temperate timber for tropical timber)
the  implementation  of  the  EUTR needs  to
build on transparency, consistency and clear
guidelines for exerting viable due diligence.
An  important  aspect  of  this  research  has
been  to  acknowledge  the  heterogeneity  of
actors and their different perceptions of the
EUTR.  It  is  clear that  some aspects  of the
regulation still need clarification and specific
interpretation. However, other structural as-
pects of the regulation need to be addressed
in order to avoid conflicts of interest in the
private sector with consideration at the same
time,  for  free  and  equitable  international
trade.
In-depth,  structured interviews with stake-
holders would have enriched the analysis in
this research project by, for example, adding
to the depth of understanding of why diffe-
rent frames are held by different stakeholder
groupings,  and  would  possibly  also  have
added  to  the  number  of  frames  identified.
Unfortunately,  it  was  not  possible  in  this
study but will be key for any future research
on this issue. Nonetheless, analyzing secon-
dary sources has still enabled the identifica-
tion of different  frames,  and an analysis  of
their likely impacts on stakeholder reception
of  the  legislation.  Further,  in-depth  inter-
views will be even more fruitful in future re-
search, once the EUTR has been fully imple-
mented by most MS and stakeholders have
had time to better grasp how the regulation
affects their interests. For the time being, it
is important to add to the understanding of
how the  regulation  is  interpreted  by stake-
holders,  and  presented  in  the  media.  Early
detection  of  problems  facing  stakeholders
will surely provide a positive impact on the
EUTR’s implementation.
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